IMPERFECT competition is a pervasive part of modern industrial economies, where high levels of concentration in product markets often coexist with unionised labour markets. Most standard macroeconomic models, however, assume that markets are perfectly competitive. This paper provides a simple framework in which we are able to explore some of the implications of imperfect competition for the macroeconomy, and to evaluate the adequacy of competitive macroeconomic models as "convenient simplifications". The results of the paper suggest that whilst some general features of competitive macromodels do carry over to an imperfectly competitive framework, others do not. Imperfect competition in the labour and product market can have a significant impact on the level of employment and the effectiveness of macroeconomic policy. Imperfect competition provides an explicit account of price and wage determination, and thus gives us a far greater insight into the macroeconomic structure of macroeconomic equilibrium than is possible in competitive models. This paper presents a simple model of imperfect competition with Walrasian features. The model is "Walrasian" both in some of its assumptions,0 and also in the properties of the model. What we have attempted to do is to take a standard neoclassical synthesis macromodel (e.g. Patinkin (1965), Branson (1979)) and introduce imperfect competition into the product and labour markets. We feel that this is a useful exercise for two reasons. 
1 The use of the terms "excess supply" and "market clearing" are the subject of disagreement. My own favoured uses are (a) market clearing means competitive-hence any non-competitive equilibrium is a non-clearing equilibrium, (b) excess supply means that at a given price suppliers would like to sell more than they do. Others who dislike this may translate into their own terminology. 2Throughout this paper we will use the term "fiscal neutrality" to mean that the fiscal multiplier is zero. We do not use the term in the technical sense of monetary theory, i.e. that no real variables are affected (although money is neutral in this sense too). real wages are unaffected by government policy, so that changes in the money supply or government expenditure feed through entirely into nominal wage and price increases. The only role for macroeconomic policy in a unionised economy in the examples presented is in the presence of multiple equilibria: macroeconomic policy can be used to ensure that the equilibrium with the highest level of employment is attained rather than a low employment equilibrium. The results of this section relate most closely to Layard and Nickell's (1985) model of NAIRU. The main conceptual difference between the two models is that Layard and Nickell adopt an essentially partial equilibrium approach for the purpose of deriving a tractable econometric model. The model we present adopts an explicit-if simple-general equilibrium framework.
Whilst the models presented in this paper are very specific, and have no claim to generality, we believe that the results should not be dismissed as simply special examples. Most of the assumptions made are absolutely standard, and the originality of the paper consists not in the ingredients but the recipe. For this reason we believe the specific models presented have conceptual implications over and beyond their mathematical implications.
Imperfect competition with a competitive labour market
We shall first lay out the basic assumptions about households, firms, and the government.
(a) The household
There is one price-taking household which has initial endowments of money M0 and leisure T and derives utility from consumption C, real money balances Mip and leisure I (money is being used as numeraire). The houlehold also receives all the profits from the two firms in the economy. The household has Cobb-Douglas utility: U = a log C + Il log I + y logM (1.1)
The household is a price-taker, and so maximises (1.1) subject to the budget constraint: 
/
As is clear from (1.3), the household's demand for consumption has a unit elasticity (as do (1.4) and (1.5)). Furthermore, all the demand functions are homogeneous of degree zero (Hodo) in prices, money balances and profits (p, w, MO, 7r). This is because (a) the budget constraint (1.2) is unaffected by an equiproportionate change in (p, w, M, 7r) (b) utility is Hodo in (p, M). Of course, we might prefer to interpret the model as being a temporary equilibrium, in which case nominal rather than real money balances would enter the household's utility function. The condition for an indirect utility function to be Hodo in (p, M) are very restrictive (see Grandmont (1984) ). However, it suits our purposes to have real money balances in the utility function because we aim to demonstrate that imperfect competition per se does not invalidate the "classical dichotomy": if the underlying competitive equilibrium is unaffected by the money supply M0, then so will the imperfectly competitive economy. The treatment of profits in imperfectly competitive general equilibrium models is problematic (see Hart (1985) ).
(b) The firm
There are two firms in the output market (this obviously generalises). They are price-takers in the labour market and there is a conjectural variations Cournot model in the output market. The assumption of price-taking in the labour market and price-making in the output market can be justified by the fact that the firm is "small" in the labour market (there are lots of firms from the many output markets), but "large" in its particular product market. Furthermore, the firms have no "general equilibrium" awareness: in taking their output decisions, they do not calculate the effects of this on the labour market (this contrasts with models such as Hart (1979) and Roberts (1980) where firms do calculate the full effect). However, the firms know the "true" household demand curve (taking w as given), which from (1.3) has unit elasticity. In this section it is assumed that firms have constant-return to scale production with one input-labour. This is a convenient simplification that enables us to derive explicit results; in Section 2 we show that the introduction of diminishing returns does not invalidate our analytical results. The output-labour ratio is normalised to unity: Government expenditure can be in two forms: levels of real expenditure g are predetermined, or nominal levels ("cash limits"). Whether government expenditure is planned in real or nominal terms will have a big influence on the effects of that expenditure on the macroeconomy (this is discussed in more detail in Dixon (1986)). The results of this paper will apply to real government expenditure plans, as is standard in the macroeconomic literature. The simplest way to model g is to conceive of the government purchasing output at a price pg determined by bilateral bargaining between the industry and government, the corresponding markup being mg. The important point is that the price which the government pays is not (directly) influenced by, and will not influence the price paid the household. This 3 Those unfamiliar with the conjectural variations model of Cournot oligopoly are referred to Waterson (1984, pp. 18-19 where C2 is the marginal propensity to consume out of (real) income.
Essentially, what happens is that government expenditure increases profits initially by jig, this increases consumption, and this leads to a feedback from output to profits to increased consumption. The increase in output due to an increase in g in (1.20) is represented in Fig. 1 .3 by a shift from initial position A to B. However, the increase in output at initial price po leads to excess demand for labour, and hence wages and prices will rise to Pi* The full fiscal multiplier can be derived if we totally differentiate the AS and AD functions with respect to g: Using (1.7) we can relate firms' conjectures q5 to the markup M and hence the multiplier by (1.23). This is done in Table 1 .
~~
Recall that when qp = 1 there is no equilibrium in the product market: we include qp = 1 since from (1.23) as M tends to 1 from below, the multiplier tends to unity. The cartel is then a limiting result. As is clear from (1.23) and Table 1 Whilst the value of M does influence the fiscal multiplier, there is always crowding out. Furthermore, the mechanisms underlying the multiplier are essentially the same-as indicated by the general formula (1.21). In this sense, the multiplier is basically "Walrasian" rather than Keynesian. We summarise the foregoing discussion in Proposition 3. We shall now show that a profits tax will leave these results unaffected. This is important, since it shows that we are justified in not treating the 
N-C (1-MAMO ?tN)-g=O AD(t) N-N(1-,-+MtMN)=O AS(t)
Total differentiation of AD(t) on AS(t) with respect to t shows that dNldt =0. The equilibrium is unaffected by the proportion of profits distributed to the shareholder. Furthermore, total differentiation with respect to g yields the same fiscal multiplier as in (1.21) and (1.23). The effectiveness of fiscal policy is not influenced by the proportion of profits distributed. This is a surprising result given that the aggregate demand multiplier derived from AD(t) holding price constant is sensitive to t (e.g. if t = 1, then dN/dgjAD = 1). The crucial point here is that if t increases, real distributed profits at the equilibrium output fall by AtMiN. The price level will fall so that real balances increase by ApM0/p2. The increase in real balances exactly offsets the fall in real distributed profits, so that total wealth remains unchanged. Since the real wage remains constant, equilibrium output and employment are unaltered. In one sense, therefore, an ad valorem profits tax can be said to have no real effects, only nominal effects. Similar exercises can be conducted for an employment tax (which reduces the real wage and share of profits in income), a (real) lump sum tax (which increases equilibrium output via the wealth effect), and an income tax (which alters the real wage and the proportion of profits which households receive). The imposition of these taxes to finance government expenditure would alter the specific results stated in this paper, as they would in a Walrasian economy. However, we hope to have convinced the reader that the Walrasian features would still shine through.
Imperfect competition with diminishing returns
In the previous section, we made the simplest possible assumptions that enabled us to derive explicit formulae for policy multipliers. One of these-the "Walrasian" assumption of constant returns-is not standard in textbook macroeconomics. Since Keynes, it has been usual to view the macroeconomic equilibrium as occurring in the "short-run"; capital is fixed. This leads to the standard assumption that there are diminishing returns to labour-output is a concave function of employment; y =f(N); f' > 0 >f".
In this section we shall see that constant returns was merely a convenient simplification. Whilst we are unable to derive explicit formulae for the multiplier, the overall logic and conclusions of the previous section are not changed.
With diminishing returns, the only additional complexity is that the real wage becomes a function of employment as well as the degree of competition in the product market. The profit maximising duopolist chooses its output so that marginal revenue equals marginal cost. Rather than being constant, marginal cost increases with output, and is given by wif'; p-wlf' 1?4) (2.la)
In the case of a perfectly competitive product market (4=-1), this simply means that the real wage equals the marginal product of labour. With imperfect competition, however, labour receives less than its marginal product. In the case of Cournot Duopoly (qp = 0) the real wage equals only one half of the marginal product. Equation (2.1a) is often referred to as the "demand curve" for labour. This is misleading, as we shall discuss below. Rather, it simply tells us the relationship between nominal wages, prices and employment that must hold with imperfectly competitive product markets.
If we now define the real wage w = wip, our macroeconomic system becomes:' 
Unions and the natural rate of unemployment
In this section, we relax the assumption that the labour market is competitive, and introduce a union which bargains with the firms over the nominal wage w. This introduces the possibility of an excess supply of labour: the union can push up the nominal wage, and hence the real wage, above the market clearing level. The resultant equilibrium will be "Keynesian" in the sense that there will be an excess supply in both the product and labour markets. However, as we shall demonstrate, the model is very un-Keynesian in that the classical dichotomy still holds (money is neutral) and fiscal policy can be less effective than in the Walrasian case. Indeed, we provide examples in which the fiscal policy multiplier is zero, and there is complete crowding out.
The model presented seems a good interpretation of Friedman's conception of the Natural Rate of Unemployment (NRH), (Friedman (1968), (1975)). Friedman's original article on the natural rate defined it as "the level ... ground out by the Walrasian system of general equilibrium equations, provided that there is embedded in them the actual structural characteristics of labour and product markets, including market imperfections, the cost of gathering information about job vacancies and so on" (1968, p8). Some economists have focussed on the word "Walrasian" in the above quote, and interpreted the NR as simply the Walrasian equilibrium (eg. Hahn (1980 p, 293)). Others focus on search models of unemployment (Mortensen (1970), Diamond (1985), Pissarides (1984), Lockwood (1985)).
The model here focusses on imperfect competition in the labour and product market-the NR as a non-Walrasian equilibrium. At the end of this section we will show how the equilibrium can be interpreted as the Natural Rate.
How should unions be introduced into this model? A first point is that we can no longer think of there being one "representative" household. There will be two types of households in equilibrium: the employed and the unemployed. The union may act in the interests of its employed members, to maximise their welfare. Secondly, since there will be rationing in the labour market, the notional consumption function will have to be altered to become an effective demand function. We will first outline the model of the household and labour market, and then the union. 
The effective demand function still has unit elasticity of demand, so our analysis of the firm in Section 1 still holds good. For a given level of (w, MO) then, the macroeconomic equilibrium is determined by: Thus a higher nominal wage leads to a lower level of employment. This is because a higher nominal wage leads to higher prices, and a higher real wage. As in the previous section, a rise in the degree of monopoly ,i leads to an inward shift in the AD curve. The AD curve is the union's real demand curve: it gives the level of employment that will result if a particular nominal wage is set. Equation (3.4-6) also tells the union the real wage that will result. As in the previous sections, the behavioural equations are all Hodo in (w, p, M?), as is the AD function.
(b) The union
Given the relationships between nominal wages, real wages, and employment contained in the AD curve and equations (3.4-6), how is the equilibrium determined? We need a model of nominal wage determination. In this section, we shall consider two different models: the monopoly-union model where unions have the power to unilaterally set the nominal wage, and a model where firms and unions bargain over the nominal wage. Given the nominal wages set, firms choose outputs and thus prices. This seems very reasonable: in practice unions have a direct say only on the wages they get, not on the prices which firms set.
There are many alternative assumptions that can be made about the union's objectives in the wage determination process. In the bargaining model we adopt the simple yet plausible assumption that the union seeks to maximise the real wage. The rationale for this is that the union seeks to maximise the utility of those households which are employed-who presumably make up its membership. As Oswald (1984) argues, if there is a seniority system such as LIFO (Last In, First Out) which determines who get laid-off, then majority voting will lead to real-wage maximisation. In the context of the monopoly union model, however, the assumption of real wage maximisation is rather extreme (with diminishing returns, real wages are maximised with one employee), so we allow for a general utility function defined on employment as well as real wages (as is common-see Oswald (1985) , Pencavel (1984) ). Constraint (3.9) represents the notion that the union cannot force people to work, and p is given through (3.4-6). We will assume that (3.9) never binds, so that from the first order conditions for (3.8) we have for an inferior maximum: f't2iY + ff"i N 2f'f"(1-) (3.10) (the second-order condition will generally be satisfied-a sufficient condition is that f"' -0). Given the equilibrium level of employment, the nominal wage is set so that AD yields N using (3.4)-(3.6). Of course an interior solution to (3.8-9) need not exist: however, that is not of interest here.6 What is of interest is that the equilibrium level of employment defined by (3.10) is determined solely by the degree of monopoly M, and the technology represented by the production function f(N). If (3.9) is binding, then the labour market clears and we revert to the equilibrium examined in Section 2.
Suppose we consider a concrete example. Let y = N -6N2, where we choose 6 small enough so that dyIdN = 1 -26N is positive for relevant N (e.g. 1/26 is greater than the Walrasian level of employment.) In this case we can solve (3.10) for the equilibrium employment level (assuming (3.9) is not binding). In Table 2 In the particular model of bargaining we have considered, there is no role for macroeconomic policy to influence the equilibrium level of employment. Unions and firms are locked into a bargaining process, the outcome of which is not influenced by monetary or fiscal policy.8
(d) A monopoly union model
An alternative assumption to a wage-bargain is that the union sets nominal wages. Thus the union sets (nominal) wages and firms set prices given the wages set. A higher nominal wage causes lower employment (through aggregate demand) and a higher real wage. The real wage equation (3.6) gives the feasible combinations of real-wage and employment. We could assume a general union utility function defined on the real wage and employment (see Oswald (1985) for a survey). In this case, the union maximises its utility subject to the real wage equation. These strong results of fiscal neutrality stem from the assumptions made about the union's objective function. Although household utility depends upon consumption and leisure, it also depends upon real balances. In the two examples given above, the union's objective was expressed purely in real terms: the nominal price level played no direct role. This suppression of the real balance effect may seem a very reasonable step: after all, how many unions worry about the impact of wage settlements on their members real balances? However, the introduction of real balances to the union's objective function would undermine the fiscal neutrality result, although homogeneity and hence monetary neutrality still hold.
We have considered two models of nominal wage determination in a unionised economy. With a union influencing wage determination, and firms prices, the resultant equilibrium can have excess supply in both the output and labour markets. In this sense the equilibrium is very Keynesian. However, the policy implications for the economy are very unkeynesian: money is neutral, and the fiscal multiplier can be zero. The basis idea behind the classical dichotomy still holds in a unionised economy. The monopoly union case is depicted in Fig. 3.1 . The equilibrium level of employment is determined in the labour market. Given the equilibrium level of employment, the nominal wage w* is set to achieve this given AD. Since the AD function is Hodo in (w, MO), an increase in MO to MO' will lead to an equiproportionate rise in the nominal wage set by the union, requires the marginal product of labour to be decreasing, so for any shaped union indifference curve it is possible to construct multiple equilibria (a sufficient condition to ensure uniqueness given that the union utility is quasiconcave is f"' -0).
Whilst non-uniqueness goes very much against the spirit of Friedman's NRH, it does not imply that the model is Keynesian, in the sense that there are multiplier effects. However, it is possible to conceive of macroeconomic policy causing the economy to switch from one equilibrium to another. Consider the following argument. In Fig. 3.2 there is a high-employment equilibrium at Nh, and a low-employment equilibrium at N,. Suppose that the economy is at the low-employment equilibrium, and that wages are fixed in the short-run due to fixed-term contracts. Given initial government polict (M', g), the union has set wage w1, as in Fig. 3.3 . Given this wage, the Where the derivatives of AD are obtained by total differentiation" of (3.3-6), and will include standard multiplier effects. Thus if monetary or fiscal policy are more expansionary than expected, employment will be higher than the equilibrium where they are fully anticipated (this model can be seen as a theoretical justification for the econometric model employed by Nickell and Layard (1985) in which only surprises in fiscal policy are effective). From the price-cost equation (3.6), p = wlf'(1 -i). Hence an increase in employment will give rise to an increase in prices, due to diminishing marginal productivity: dp Of course, the causality does not run from surprises in prices to deviations in employment: rather it runs from surprises in aggregate demand to deviations in employment and prices. Note that this neutrality result is much stronger than in a Walrasian economy where money is neutral, but even fully anticipated fiscal policy is not. Given the basic set-up of fixed-wage contracts, we are able to provide a rigorous story of deviations from the "natural rate", which is in effect the short-run Phillips-curve. If we combine this with an appropriate model of expectations formation, then we can tell the usual stories. With rational expectations, surprises in government policy will be a white-noise error term, and hence deviations from the natural rate will be purely transitory. With adaptive expectations, there can be short-run deviations, but employment will tend back to the long-run equilibrium.
Conclusion
This paper has explored some of the implications of imperfect competition for macroeconomic policy within the simplest possible macroeconomic model with proper macroeconomic foundations. In the product market there is a conjectural variations Cournot oligopoly model which allows for a wide range of competitive behaviour from perfect competition to joint profit maximization. In the labour market we considered the case of perfect competition and two models of wage determination in a unionised labour market. Whilst it is dangerous to draw general conclusions from specific models, we feel that the following broad lessons can be drawn. Imperfect competition matters. Not only does imperfect competition influence the equilibrium levels of employment and prices, it also influences the effectiveness of fiscal policy. With a competitive labour market the fiscal multiplier is larger the less competitive is the product market (though there is still crowding out). With a unionised labour market we presented two examples where there was complete crowding out. All three examples presented point towards "classical" conclusions about fiscal policy-there is partial or complete crowding out. Of course, it may well be possible that alternative assumptions might yield more Keynesian results.
Perhaps the most crucial assumption in the models presented is that there is a single sector. In Dixon (1986) we present a two-sector model of a unionized economy, which shares most of the assumptions of this paper. The union in each sector sets its wage, given the wage set by the other union. With two sectors, the unionized equilibrium does not have a unique natural rate of employment, but rather a "natural range" of employment. Hence macroeconomic policy is not ineffective, as in this paper. There is a limited range of feasible levels of employment which can be achieved by an appropriate policy.
There is one aspect of a perfectly competitive economy that can carry over to an imperfectly competitive economy: the neutrality of money. The basic justification for neutrality is the homogeneity of the underlying behavioural equations. This homogeneity is unaffected by imperfect competition per se. However, even in a perfectly competitive economy homogeneity is an extremely strong assumption (see Grandmont (1984) ). Whilst we have adopted a basic framework that includes homogeneity for simplicity, it is no more plausible here than in competitive macromodels.
Imperfect competition has an ambiguous relationship to keynesian economics. If firms set prices, and unions wages, it is possible to have a macroeconomic equilibrium which is Keynesian in the sense that if agents were price-takers, they would like to sell more at equilibrium prices. Imperfect competition leads to a non-Walrasian equilibrium. The implications for macroeconomic policy are very non-Keynesian. In the examples presented of a unionised economy, fiscal policy had no effect on equilibrium employment, because an increase in government expenditure causes wages and prices to rise, crowding out private consumption by the real balance effect.
Certainly, the models of a unionised economy presented seem to have more affinity with Friedman's Natural Rate. We argued that the imperfectly competitive equilibrium can be seen as a natural interpretation of the Natural Rate, and one of which Friedman is aware. If we combine the model of the unionised economy with short run wage rigidity, the usual Phillips curve stories arise. The only scope for macroeconomic policy in this context appears to be in the case of multiple equilibria. If wages are fixed in the short-run, the government can ensure that the equilibrium with the highest level of employment is attained. 
